Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, The by Fenton, Howard N. III




Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and
Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, The
Howard N. III Fenton
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the International Trade Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Howard N. III Fenton, Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, The , 13 Nw. J. Int'l
L. & Bus. 563 (1992-1993)
The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign
Affairs: State and Local Foreign
Policy Trade Restrictions
Howard N. Fenton, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
State and local foreign trade restrictions represent the convergence
of two main threads of the globalization of the U.S. experience, and raise
a serious challenge to the historic allocation of foreign policy responsibil-
ity to the federal government. The internationalization of state and local
economies is the first thread. The second is the heightened efforts of
state, city and county governments to play a role in foreign affairs and
foreign policy decisions. Where they meet finds states and cities using
their new-found international economic leverage to influence not only
United States' foreign policy, but the domestic policies of foreign nations
as well. At a time when economic sanctions are emerging as the weapons
of choice in maintaining international order, these state and local efforts
threaten to undermine the authority and effectiveness of United States'
foreign policy.
During the last 10 years the significance and profile of international
commerce in state and local economies has dramatically increased. For-
eign companies' facilities have become a much sought-after part of the
domestic landscape. Likewise, overseas markets, international trade
agreements and foreign economic policy have become staples of the local
news because they impact directly and immediately on the local econ-
omy. At the same time, local governments have begun to concern them-
selves with global political developments. Arms control and nuclear
"freezes," Central American economic, military, and refugee questions,
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. B.S. 1971, J.D. 1975, Uni-
versity of Texas.
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and international environmental concerns have all earned substantial lo-
cal legislative attention.'
While many of the state and local actions involve precatory resolu-
tions, sister-city relationships, or aid and assistance arrangements, the
highest proffle measures have involved forms of local economic coercion
directed at South Africa and more recently, Northern Ireland. States,
cities and counties have restricted the investment of their funds or award-
ing of their contracts to firms conforming to specified practices or poli-
cies in trade with specified foreign nations. These state and local trade
restrictions have been roughly modelled after the rather substantial ef-
forts of the United States government to influence international behavior
through trade controls. While the state and local measures have both
anticipated and followed federal actions, what is most striking is the fre-
quent inconsistency in both means and objectives of these efforts with
federal policy, creating two or more versions of "United States" foreign
policy.
Nowhere has this been more apparent than with regard to sanctions
against South Africa. The more than 140 city and state restrictions, af-
fecting over $20 billion in economic leverage,2 anticipated the 1986 pas-
sage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act by several years. The
policy objectives of these state and local laws were generally far broader
than those of the federal act, and have for the most part survived the
1991 lifting of the federal sanctions. This has raised fundamental ques-
tions about the United States' basic policy toward South Africa and the
reforms of the minority white government. While the freeing of Nelson
I See Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 FOREIGN
PoL'Y 158 (1992):
The explosive growth of municipal foreign policy in the past decade has been impressive: As of
1991, more than 900 localities passed resolutions supporting a "freeze" in the arms race; 197
demanded a halt to nuclear testing; 120 refused to cooperate with the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency's nuclear-war exercises; 126, plus 27 states, divested more than $20 billion
from firms doing business in South Africa; 86 formed linkages with Nicaragua and, along with
grassroots activists, provided more humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan people than all
the military aid Congress voted for the contras; 80, along with the U.S. Conference of Mayors,
demanded cuts in the Pentagon's budget; 73 formed sister-city relationships with Soviet cities
(roughly 50 more are pending); 29 provided sanctuary for Guatemalan and Salvadoran refu-
gees; 20 passed stratospheric protection ordinances phasing out ozone-depleting chemicals; and
at least 10 established funded offices of international affars-in essence municipal state
departments.
For an example of the potential divisiveness of some of these efforts, see Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith, Propaganda by Initiative: Middle East Ballot Resolutions (Dec. 1988) (discussions of
four 1988 local ballots initiated condemning Israel for its policy towards Palestinians and the West
Bank).
2 Am. Comm. on Africa, State and Municipal Governments Take Aim at Apartheid, Briefing
Paper at I (May 1991). See also A GUIDE TO AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL LAWS ON SOUTH
AFRICA 1-4 (William F. Moses, ed., 1991) [hereinafter IRRC SOUTH AFRICA].
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Mandela and the reforms of 1990 and 1991 earned South Africa the re-
moval of sanctions by most western powers, including the United States,
only one of the over 140 local or state laws has been repealed, leaving
most U.S. companies subject to very substantial restrictions if they ven-
ture into the South African economy,3 and South Africa subject to the
same pressure in any attempt to encourage U.S. investment.
South African sanctions are by no means the only area of conflict, as
localities in recent years have focused on Soviet bloc nations, Arab states,
Iran, and most recently British treatment of Northern Ireland. Fourteen
states and 34 local jurisdictions have sought to intercede on behalf of the
Catholic minority in Ulster, a policy issue largely avoided by the federal
government. The increasing clashes among nationalities in Eastern Eu-
rope and the former Soviet states raises the possibility of even more local
and state action because of the large ethnic Eastern European popula-
tions of many U.S. communities.
The growing popularity of these laws has thus far overrun the fun-
damental question of their validity under the Constitution of the United
States. Only one state court has specifically addressed this question,4 and
while some notable commentators have asserted the constitutionality of
these laws,5 extremely serious questions exist about both the legality and
the wisdom of imposing a state or local government's ideas of appropri-
ate international behavior through trade restrictions.6
3 U.S. Businesses Awaiting Resolution of Issues Before Return to South Africa, WALL ST. J.,
March 23, 1992, at A7.
4 The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court decision upholding the constitutionality
of the Baltimore divestment law. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of City of
Baltimore v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720 (1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Lubman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) [hereinafter Board of
Trustees v. City of Baltimore]. A Michigan divestment law was struck down, but on state constitu-
tional grounds. Regents of Univ. ofMich. v. State, 419 N.W.2d 773 (Mich. App. 1988). An Illinois
statute denying a tax exemption for the sale of South African coins was also found invalid on state
constitutional grounds. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (IM. 1986).
5 LAURENCE H. TRIaE, AMERICAN CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW 469,480 n.12 (2d ed. 1988); Rich-
ard B. Bilder, Special Issue: The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs:
Distribution of Constitutional Authority: The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 821 (1989). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Memorandum on the Nonpreemptive Effect of the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 Upon State and Social Measures, 132 CONG. REC. S12534
(daily ed. Sept 15, 1986).
6 States have been recently rebuffed in two other areas of foreign policy intervention. Two U.S.
Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court ruled against the purported authority of state governors to
prevent their state national guard units from participating in training in Central America. Perpich v.
United States Dep't. of Defense 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989); aff'd, 110 S.Ct. 2418 (1990); Dukakis v.
United States Dept. of Defense, 859 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1988). In United States v. City of Oakland,
CaL, D.C. No. CV-89-03305-JPV (N. D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 958 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1992), the federal
district court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment against the City of Oakland's
nuclear-free zone ordinance. For a disapproving discussion of these cases, see Shuman, supra note 1.
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Inasmuch as trade relations are now an inseparable part of U.S. for-
eign relations, the proliferating state and local views expressed and pro-
moted through even the indirect trade restrictions have the potential to
seriously disrupt U.S. foreign policy. They may also interfere with the
ability of U.S. firms to pursue trade opportunities around the globe.
Working through the maze of federal trade controls is difficult enough
without having to consider the foreign policy goals of 50 states and hun-
dreds of local jurisdictions.
This article describes the nature of state and local trade restrictions
and discusses constitutional and statutory barriers to their legitimacy.
The article suggests why states are not good laboratories for the creation
of foreign policy and why the federal model is not appropriate for eco-
nomic sanctions. It also describes the strong appeal these laws have for
local governments, the relatively small chance of federal legislative relief,
and the importance of a definitive judicial statement of their status.
II. THE NATURE OF STATE AND LOCAL TRADE CONTROLS
States7 have historically made few efforts to regulate directly the in-
ternational trade activities of their residents for political purposes.' In
the 1960's, a number of jurisdictions adopted laws banning the sale of
goods from communist countries. 9 Although only one of the laws was
ever challenged and struck down in a local court, 10 this effort died out.
New York State and New York City unsuccessfully attempted to apply
For a detailed argument for the invalidity of nuclear-free ordinances, see Patrick J. Borchers & Paul
F. Daver, Taming the New Breed of Nuclear Free Zone Ordinances; Statutory and Constitutional
Infirmities in Local Procurement Ordinances Blacklisting the Producers of Nuclear Weapons Compo-
nents, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (1988).
7 The constitutional position of state and local governments with regard to foreign affairs is
virtually identical. Therefore references to states throughout this material include their subordinate
jurisdictions unless otherwise indicated.
8 States have been more inclined to legislate for economic purposes, chiefly to preclude or re-
strict foreign goods and services under "Buy America" laws. These laws raise some of the same
issues as the political trade restrictions. While there has been more litigation over the "Buy
America" laws, there is no agreement as to their validity, and the United States Supreme Court has
not addressed the question. Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Los Angeles, 276 Ca. App. 2d 221
(1969) (California statute unconstitutional) with KS.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey DisL
Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977) (New Jersey law valid in part as state market
participation) and Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cerL
denied, 111 S.Ct. 2814 (1991) (Pennsylvania law not preempted, and valid under the Commerce
Clause as state market participation). See generally Note, Buy-American Statutes - An Assessment
of Validity Under Present Law and a Recommendation for Preemption 23 RUTGERS L.J. 137 (1991).
9 See Richard B. Bilder, East-West Trade BoycottW. A Study in Private, Labor Union, State and
Local Interference With Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. Rav. 841, 882-86 (1970).
10 City of Columbus v. McGuire, 195 N.E.2d 916 (Columbus Mun. Ct. 1963); City of Columbus
v. Miqdadi, 195 N.E.2d 923 (Columbus Mun. Ct. 1963).
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their civil rights laws to South African entities,11 and Florida enacted a
ban on licensing communist-owned fishing vessels which continues in
force.12 It was not until the early 1970's, however, that states made a
major legislative effort at direct regulation of trade activities.
As part of a widespread response to the 1970's petrodollar enhanced
Arab boycott of Israel, 13 states enacted antiboycott laws between 1974
and 1978.13 While these laws addressed a number of different manifesta-
tions of the Arab boycott, they generally sought to ban certain conduct
by state residents relating to commercial transactions with Arab state
customers. What all of these laws had in common was that they directly
regulated the international business activities of state residents. This ap-
proach would appear to be the one most easily rejected by federal courts
as violative of constitutionally mandated federal prerogatives, but these
laws were never tested in court.
In 1977, Congress enacted the antiboycott provisions of the Export
Administration Act (EAA), and expressly preempted these state laws. 14
Since that time, the focus of state legislation has been on the indirect use
of economic leverage on U.S. firms trading abroad. Under this approach,
the states seek to compel certain behavior from businesses and individu-
als through use of the states' economic leverage. While states are not
significant international traders themselves - i.e., they do not sell or buy
extensively in world markets - they are significant domestic buyers and
investors. Consequently, while they have virtually no ability to influence
a particular foreign nation through curtailing or eliminating their own
international trading activities (a primary economic boycott), they exer-
cise their domestic leverage over firms with which they do business in a
manner designed to influence foreign nations (a secondary economic
boycott).
A. Divestment
By far the most common form of state trade restriction is divest-
ment. Almost 200 jurisdictions have adopted some form of law restrict-
ing investments in companies doing business with South Africa,
Northern Ireland, and other nations. 15 Because states control a substan-
11 South African Airways v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1970); New York Times v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963
(N.Y. 1977).
12 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 370.21(3) (1988).
13 See Eric L. Hirschhorn and Howard N. Fenton III, States' Rights and the Antiboycott Provi-
sions Of the Export Administration Act, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 517, 522-23 (1981).
14 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (1988).
15 IRRC SouTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 1. (143 states or localities); Welsh, A GUIDE TO U.S.
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tial volume of funds through their normal revenue-raising efforts as well
as through special accounts such as education trust funds and employee
retirement accounts, their investment decisions can have a considerable
impact on banks or corporations seeking depositors and investors. For
example, anti-apartheid divestment action by the California and New
Jersey employee retirement funds affected an estimated $8 billion in
investments. 16
The anti-apartheid divestment laws operate in a variety of different
ways and set a wide range of standards for the behavior of companies. 7
At one extreme, they require divestment of all interest in firms doing
business with or in South Africa,"8 or ban new investment in firms doing
business there.' 9 The other principal variation limits investment to firms
operating in South Africa that subscribe to the employment standards
contained in the Sullivan Principles.2' Even among these particular laws,
however, there is substantial diversity, with some laws limiting invest-
ments to firms that have been judged as highly successful in implement-
ing these employment-related principles, while others only limit
investments to firms that have promised to adhere to the principles.21
Other laws impose limitations on bank deposits or obtaining financial
services from banks that do business with South Africa or make loans to
certain South African Government agencies.22
Since 1985, a number of states and cities have sought to influence
another foreign issue, the perceived employment discrimination against
the Catholic minority in primarily Protestant Northern Ireland.23 This
is only one issue in the broader conflict between the Protestant and Cath-
olic factions in Ulster that has been the source of violence and contro-
LAWS AND LEGISLATION IN SUPPORT OF THE MACBRIDE PRINCIPLES 1 (1992) [hereinafter IRRC
MACBRIDE PRINCIPLES] (46 states and localities).
16 Am. Comm. on Africa, supra note 2, at 1.
17 See IRRC SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 2-3; see also Howard N. Fenton III, State and
Local Anti-Apartheid Laws" Misplaced Response to a Flawed National Policy on South Africa, 19
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 883, 889-93 (1987).
18 See IRRC SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 99-105.
19 Id.
20 These standards were designed to provide black employees of U.S. firms in South Africa with
training, employment, and supervisory and managerial opportunities. See Rev. Leon Sullivan,
Agents for Change: The Mobilization of Multinational Companies in South Africa, 15 L. & POL'Y.
INT'L BUS. 427, 428-35 (1983). Ironically, Rev. Sullivan abandoned advocacy of these measures in
favor of total disengagement by U.S. firms from South Africa. See American Investment in South
Africa: After Sullivan, ECONOMIST, June 13, 1987, at 71.
21 See IRRC SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 99-105.
22 Id.
23 See Evelyn Ellis, Equal Opportunity in Employment in Northern Ireland: The Government's
Proposal, 16 PUB.L. 40 (1987).
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versy in that country for many years. Fourteen states, including
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island,
and 34 cities have enacted advisory or mandatory divestment laws di-
rected towards firms that have business relationships with Northern Ire-
land. Other jurisdictions are considering such rules.25
The divestment laws directed towards Northern Ireland have been
more uniform than the anti-apartheid laws. These laws, as well as the
contracting restrictions, all seek to promote adoption by U.S. firms oper-
ating in Ulster of the MacBride Principles, an employers' code patterned
after the Sullivan Principles, which addresses discrimination against
Catholics.26 While some of the laws order divestment from firms that do
not adopt the MacBride Principles,27 most call for studies and reports on
the levels of compliance among firms in the states' investment
portfolios. 28
Massachusetts has adopted a somewhat different approach to the
controversy in Northern Ireland. In addition to promoting the Mac-
Bride Principles, the state bans certain investments in firms that sell
weapons or munitions that are used in Northern Ireland.2 9 The law is
implicitly directed at firms selling such items to the British military.
Finally, the former Soviet Union and Iran have been the targets of
indirect state trade controls as well. Michigan enacted a divestment re-
quirement for university funds that applies to firms trading with the So-
viet Union,3 0 while Connecticut adopted divestment rules against Iran.3"
The Iranian restrictions illustrate the way in which intense, momentary
public outcry can lead to local trade restrictions, since this law was a
direct result of the 1989 U.S. embassy hostage crisis.
24 See generally Comment, Northern Ireland: The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1985 - Protestant Oppo-
sition to Political Representation for the Catholic Minority: The Apartheid of the United Kingdom, 10
SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 425 (1986).
25 IRRC MAcBRiDE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 1-2. See also More Cities Sign on to Mac-
Bride Principles, BULL. OF MUN. FOREIGN POL'Y., Summer 1989, at 33. This journal is published
by the Center for Innovative Diplomacy of Irvine, California, a coordinating group for state and
local foreign policy initiatives. See City Activism: When Foreign Policy Begins at Home, ECONOMIrST,
Sept. 9, 1989, at 28.
26 IRRC MACBRIDE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 37.
27 Id at 33.
28 Id.
29 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23 (1)(d)(iii) (West 1991).
30 MIcH. COMp. LAW § 37.2402(g) (1985). This provision, along with the South African Ban,
see id. § 37.2402(0, was struck down by a Michigan appellate court on state constitutional grounds
(separation of powers). Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. State, 419 N.W. 2d 773 (Mich. App. 1988).
31 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-13g (West 1987). State administrative action (denying univer-
sity admission to Iranian students) directed against Iran was struck down on constitutional grounds
by a federal district court in Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980).
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B. Contract Debarment
The most direct way that a state can use its economic influence is to
disqualify companies that refuse to comply with the state's international
trade objectives from doing business with the state.3 2 Thus, when the
New York state antiboycott law was preempted by the 1977 EAA
amendments, both the state and New York City adopted laws barring
firms found to have violated the federal antiboycott law from contracting
with the state or city.33 Following this example, the states of Maryland
and North Carolina adopted legislation,34 and the states of Michigan,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey took administrative action,35 to restrict
purchases from U.S. firms that do business with South Africa if those
firms fail to meet the conditions set forth in their respective directives.
Over 50 local jurisdictions, including New York City, adopted similar
contract disqualification legislation. 36  Nine local governments have
more recently adopted contracting restrictions directed towards U.S. cor-
porate actions in Northern Ireland.37
The debarment laws are more focused than the divestment rules.
Most of the laws directed towards South Africa bar public contracts with
companies that maintain any trading relationship with South Africa.38
Many statutes also ban the purchase of South African origin goods and
services.39 While many of the statutes contain exceptions for items
deemed to be essential or unduly expensive as a result of the rule to the
state or local contracting body, the objective of those laws has been dis-
engagement rather than reform. Restrictions aimed at Northern Ireland,
on the other hand, seek the commitment of U.S. firms to provide eco-
nomic opportunities to Catholics through implementation of the Mac-
32 Contract debarment has been used to promote nuclear-free zones as well. Oakland's efforts
rejected by the federal courts, see supra note 6, included contract debarment provisions.
33 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220-f (McKinney 1986); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 139-h (McKinney 1989).
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 114 (1986). These laws are almost certainly invalid now under the
Supreme Court's decision expressly rejecting a Wisconsin debarment law based on violations of the
National Labor Relations Act. See Wisconsin Dep't. of Labor v. Gould, Ina, 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
Interest in this approach to the boycott issue remains, however, as reflected by a loss Angeles City
Council member's recent introduction of a contract debarment measure. See Anti-Boycott Ordinance
Proposed by LA. Councilman, BoYcoTT REPORT 4 (June-July 1992).
34 MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 14-501 to 504 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-
141 (1991).
35 IRRC SoUTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 108.
36 Id.
37 IRRC MACBRIDE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 33.
38 All five state restrictions take this approach. See IRRC SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 12-
15, 18-19.
39 See IRRC SouTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 99-105.
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Bride Principles.40 Depending on the size of the government
procurement contracts involved and the market positions of the compa-
nies involved, these laws range from being mere nuisances to constituting
virtual commands. The Eastman Kodak Company, for example, with-
drew from South Africa altogether, allegedly in response to the
threatened loss of its business with the New York City Government.4 1
As discussed in greater detail below, the debarment laws appear to
be the most vulnerable of the state and local trade sanctions to legal chal-
lenges, especially in light of a 1986 decision, Wisconsin Department of
Industry, Labor, and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc.,42 in which the
Supreme Court invalidated a Wisconsin debarment law that penalized
firms that had violated the federal National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151.
III. THE VALIDITY OF STATE AND LOCAL TRADE CONTROLS:
Two CENTRAL ISSUES
The state and local trade restrictions are subject to challenge on
three distinct grounds: federal statutory preemption; unconstitutional re-
strictions on foreign commerce; and unconstitutional interference in for-
eign policy under the supremacy clause. These arguments represent
three distinct lines of authority establishing the preeminence of the fed-
eral role in the area of foreign trade controls, but they all involve the
same two fundamental inquiries.
First, the tests examine the purpose of the state and local laws to
determine whether they are designed to serve some legitimate local pur-
pose or whether they are efforts to affect the foreign affairs of the United
States or the internal affairs of a foreign state. Second, each test exam-
ines whether the controls at issue interfere with the current or prospec-
tive ability of the federal government to address the same issue. The
best-known formulation of this inquiry is whether the laws limit the abil-
ity of the United States to speak with one voice on a matter of significant
international concern. While focusing on the same two questions, the
three tests frame the inquiries and weigh the answers somewhat differ-
ently. However, if the laws have no legitimate local purpose and impede
the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, they would appear to be invalid under
all three tests, as discussed below.
The statutory preemption test for state and local trade controls in-
40 IRRC MACBRIDE PRINcIPLEs, supra note 15, at 1-2, 33.
41 American Cities Take on Pretoria, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1986, at C4.
42 475 U.S. 282 (1986). The Court based its decision in that case on preemption of the state
action by the National Labor Relations Act.
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volves determining whether the Congress or the President intended to
preempt state action through legislative or executive trade control re-
gimes, since this intent is the "touchstone" of traditional preemption
analysis.4 3 Because the states and localities have little (if any) residual
authority in the area of foreign relations, preemption would be easily
found unless the state and local laws can be characterized exclusively or
predominantly as exercises of spending or police powers.
The prospect of interference with foreign policy is more important
to this preemption discussion because the preemption test focuses on the
federal government's intent. If the Congress or the President has acted
in a fashion inconsistent with the state action, or in a manner that indi-
cates an intent to "occupy the field," the state laws will be preempted.
With regard to foreign relations, the Supreme Court presumes such in-
tent to occupy the field and has suggested that the government must af-
firmatively approve state actions in order to overcome the presumption.'
The issue of the legitimate local purpose of these state and local laws
is central to resolving the second major hurdle faced by these laws -
namely, the challenge posed by the laws' apparent interference with the
foreign commerce of the United States, contrary to the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.45 The primary defense offered by proponents
for these state and local trade controls is that they are shielded from
scrutiny under traditional analyses of burdens placed on interstate or for-
eign commerce, because these laws merely reflect terms of the states' par-
ticipation in the market for investments, goods or services. This
characterization goes to both the purpose of the laws and the means of
implementation, but the issues raised by this "market participation" de-
fense are essentially issues of local purpose versus foreign goals.
If the laws fail to qualify for this market participation defense, and
possess no other legitimate local purposes, then the burdens they place
on foreign commerce are likely to be deemed to be intentional intrusions
into the regulation of foreign trade. Moreover, even if the burdens im-
posed by such laws on foreign commerce were incidental to a legitimate
local purpose, the impairment of the ability of the federal government to
"speak with one voice" in the area of foreign policy could also invalidate
the laws. This "one voice" test was first articulated by the Supreme
Court in the foreign commerce cases,' and its resolution will probably
43 Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). See also Louis HENKiN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrutUnON 244 (1972).
44 South-Central Timber Dev., Ina v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 n.7 (1984). See also Wardair
Canada Ina v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
46 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
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dictate the outcome of this inquiry into the Commerce Clause implica-
tions of state and local trade controls.
Finally, the question of the purpose of the state and local trade con-
trol laws holds a central place in the Supremacy Clause analysis under
the Constitution as well.47 Because the foreign policy of the United
States has been reserved to the federal government, the Supreme Court
has looked askance at state actions impinging on the exercise of foreign
relations powers. The leading case struck down state action in an area of
traditional state authority because it was taken in a manner calculated to
communicate a hostile message to foreign governments.48 To the extent
the current wave of state and local trade restriction laws are designed to
effect change or communicate disapproval of the policies of a foreign
state, they may impermissibly impinge on the federal government's exer-
cise of foreign relations powers. The one voice test appears less impor-
tant to this analysis because the Supreme Court presumes that the United
States only has one voice in the articulation of its foreign policy.
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that resolving the ques-
tions about the actual purposes of the state and local trade controls and
the extent to which they conflict (or have the potential to conflict) with
federal law and policy will either resolve or dramatically narrow the legal
inquiry relating to the three principal challenges to the laws. Because
these two questions can be answered without regard to the test or tests
they relate to, the factual and policy issues raised by the questions will be
considered separately in some detail in the next section. Following that,
the three tests will be reconsidered in light of the conclusions reached
regarding questions of local purpose and policy conflict, to complete the
evaluation of the legal and constitutional status of state and local trade
controls.
A. The Purpose of State and Local Trade Control Laws.
In upholding the Baltimore divestment statute (in the only case liti-
gated to date on local South Africa divestment statutes), the Maryland
Court of Appeals maintained that the traditional state authority to regu-
late such investments provided the only local purpose necessary for the
law. In the weakest part of its opinion, the court failed to discuss how
the restrictions relating to South African investments furthered that local
purpose other than on moral grounds.49 The court concluded that the
tradition of local regulation of investments created what it found to be a
47 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see HENKiN, supra note 43, at 238-41.
48 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
49 Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, supra note 4, at 741, 746-52.
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strong presumption of legitimacy for the restrictions on South Africa.1°
But it is that foreign connection that must be expressly justified as to its
local purpose, not the vehicle chosen for implementation of local
sanctions.
The true question is whether a state is seeking to influence the atti-
tudes of the companies in which it invests, and, through them, to change
the racial policies of the South African Government or religious discrimi-
nation in Northern Ireland. Or is the state simply exercising sound fiscal
or moral responsibility in its selective investment practices? Although
somewhat simplified, these questions illustrate the debate over the pur-
ported local purposes of the state and local trade control laws. While
proponents have defended the legitimacy of purportedly local fiscal and
moral concerns, the weight of the evidence points toward a conscious,
organized and concerted effort by interest groups and state and local gov-
ernments to influence either national policy towards South Africa and
Northern Ireland or the direction of events in those countries.
The subjects of the laws themselves demonstrate that the states are
not in pursuit of local purposes in adopting such laws. A briefing paper
of the American Committee on Africa, a group promoting state and local
anti-apartheid laws, describes such measures as "people's sanctions," and
states that "[t]he most effective actions taken to force U.S. Companies to
end their South African business ties have been those taken at the state
and municipal level."51
The local interest justifications offered for the laws seem to be an
effort at post hoc rationalization. The public sentiment or political inter-
est propelling the legislation relates directly to particular international
issues.52 Outrage at the racial policies of South Africa or concern over
religious problems in Ulster attracts the attention of lawmakers. The re-
sulting statutes, restricting or conditioning state investment or spending
on the basis of certain behavior in those nations, are calculated to have
some influence on businesses actively involved in those areas. While the
primary purpose of the laws might be an appeal to the sentiments of local
voters, this type of "local purpose" is unlikely to be sufficient justification
for state action deemed offensive to federal constitutional priorities.
One of the principal arguments offered by proponents in support of
50 Id. at 741.
51 Am. Comm. on Africa, supra note 2, at 1.
52 Some argue that foreign policy concerns are legitimate local interests that should be en-
couraged. See, eg., Shuman, supra note 1, at 172: The underlying assumption of those who would
exclude localities from foreign policy - that municipal foreign policy can only hurt U.S. foreign
policies - is naive. There are literally hundreds of examples of municipal foreign policies that have
benefitted U.S. foreign policy by making it more democratic, more accountable, and more effective.
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a local purpose for these laws is the fiscal responsibility justification. 3
Under this theory, the states enact divestment or debarment laws to pro-
tect their investments from the risks attendant on participation in the
South African economy. There are two apparent problems with this ar-
gument. First, many of the laws do not ban investments in firms active
in South Africa; instead they seek to encourage certain types of behavior
there. Similarly, none of the laws directed towards Northern Ireland
bans investment there; they all seek to compel U.S. firms to behave in a
certain manner. While a company may reduce its economic risks by
leaving South Africa, remaining in the country and taking a progressive
position on racial relations has no apparent or unambiguous effect on the
economic risks involved with investment in that nation.
The second problem with the fiscal integrity argument is the implicit
assertion that investments in South Africa or Northern Ireland areper se
riskier than any other foreign investments. If foreign risk is to be a pri-
mary criterion for a state's investment policy, then scrutiny of state port-
folios for companies involved in debt-ridden Latin American or African
nations, or for those companies in any country engaged in a military ac-
tion or fighting a substantial insurgency, for example, must also become
targets for divestment. The fiscal policy argument was specifically re-
jected by the trial court in the Baltimore divestment statute case.54 Such
a highly selective concern about the risk of particular investments pro-
vides no rational local purpose for these laws.
The second primary justification offered by proponents of these con-
trols is the states' interest in the moral integrity of their investments.55
Do states have a legitimate interest in preventing state resources from
being used in a manner repugnant to their citizens' moral standards?
Furthermore, can the states legitimately use these resources themselves
to attempt to influence change consistent with their citizens' moral (or
ethnic or religious) views? When the particular conduct at issue is ulti-
mately that of a foreign power, the question becomes a constitutional one
regarding the appropriate role of the states.
The moral integrity argument seems to be a stronger rationale for
local purpose when it is used to support pure divestment, i e., banning
53 See Kevin P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Di-
vestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REv. 469, 496-97 (1987).
54 Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System of Baltimore v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, No. 863650651 CE-59858, slip op. at 14, n. I (Cir. Ct. for Bait. City July 17, 1987). See
McArdle, In Defense of State and local Government Anti-Apartheid Measures Infusing Democratic
Values into Foreign Policymaking, 62 TEMPLE L. REV. 813, 824-32 (1989) (a discussion and defense
of the trial court decision).
55 See Lewis, supra note 53, at 499-506.
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investments in any enterprise doing any form of business with a repulsive
foreign regime. The concerns of the public are resolved when the invest-
ments are eliminated. That such divestment may induce firms to aban-
don business with the foreign country may be dismissed as a possible, but
by no means sought after, collateral effect of the decision. However,
when the investment or contracting laws expressly focus instead on the
continuing activities of firms doing business in the foreign countries at
issue, in a manner that might be expected to bring about change in those
regimes, the possibility of influencing reform in a foreign state cannot be
so easily dismissed as an unanticipated or collateral side-effect.5 6
In either case, however, the rationales generally set forth by sup-
porters of the laws emphasize the objective of influencing change. The
coordinated campaigns of various interest groups promoting these state
and local laws tend to focus on the cumulative effect these laws have for
promoting reform. To the extent that this goal is a primary purpose of
the laws and not a mere collateral effect, the moral integrity basis for the
local purpose argument is likely to fail.
An alternative argument offered by supporters seeking a legitimate
local purpose for these laws is that when the actions of a foreign power
are widely recognized to violate accepted standards of international be-
havior, states should be able to use their investments to promote interna-
tional legal norms.5 7 The readily apparent problem with this argument is
determining when a nation reaches this level of egregious behavior. For
example, there is certainly no consensus that the United Kingdom's ac-
tions in Ulster have become the moral equivalent of South African
apartheid, yet states are directing their divestment laws at both govern-
ments. In addition, this argument, like the moral investing argument,
requires the state and local governments to sit in judgment over foreign
nations and take economic actions to illustrate, if not effectuate those
56 This is another weakness in the Maryland Court of Appeals decision. The court concluded in
part that the Baltimore divestment law was constitutional because it had such a minimal impact on
South Africa, i.e. that it was not effective in influencing reform in South Africa. See Board of Trust-
ees v. City of Baltimore, supra note 4, at 746-47. The trial court noted the anomalous nature of this
reasoning:
Even though some of the supporters of the divestment movement may have hoped to exert
economic and political pressure on the government of South Africa in order to bring an end to
apartheid, that aspiration has not been realized. Perhaps ironically, the more successful that
aspiration would be, the closer the Ordinance would come to encroaching on an area reserved
exclusively for the Federal government. Board of Trustees v. Mayer and City Council of Balti-
more, No. 863650651/CE-59858, slip op. at 15-16 (Cir. Ct. for Balt. City July 17, 1987).
The weakness of this justification has been noted by proponents of state and local laws. "In other
words, the maryland judges declared that municipal foreign policy is legal only if it is ineffectual."
Shuman, supra note 1, at 160.
57 See generally Richard B. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International
Human Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 153, 155-64 (1978).
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judgments. This local purpose, as a matter of constitutional law, has
been determined to be illegitimate."8 The states simply do not have a role
under the constitution in articulating and executing independent foreign
policies.
B. The Impact of State and Local Laws on the Ability of the United
States to Speak with One Voice in Matters of Foreign Policy
The discussion of the effect of state and local trade controls on the
ability of the U.S. to speak with one voice is based on three fundamental
assumptions: (1) that foreign policy formulation is the constitutional
preserve of the federal government; (2) that the federal government on
occasion implements foreign policy through the use of trade controls;
and (3) that the divestment and debarment laws of the state and local
governments have an impact on the behavior of targeted companies. The
first two assumptions need no discussion.5 9 However, the third assump-
tion is frequently disputed by many defenders of the state and local laws.
Paradoxically, they maintain that these laws have no influence on the
companies affected and that the objective of the laws is merely to com-
municate a moral or philosophical community position.' The Maryland
Court of Appeals decision upholding Baltimore's divestment law adopted
this argument in stating that the ordinances did "not attempt to impose
sanctions on South Africa,"' and finding them without significant im-
pact under preemption, foreign policy or foreign commerce scrutiny.
As indicated above, the total value of assets now subject to some
form of state and local South Africa divestment or debarment law ex-
ceeds $20 billion. Those jurisdictions and organizations promoting the
sanctions generally do so on the basis of their presumed or potential im-
pact on the target firms. The specific requirements of many of these laws
point clearly toward individual reforms that the jurisdictions desire to see
58 Zschernig v. Miller, supra note 48. See also notes 115-26, infra, and accompanying text.
59 Proponents of state and local foreign policy actions will take issue with the first statement that
foreign affairs are the preserve of the federal government. See Shuman, supra note 1, at 158. From a
legal perspective advocates of municipal foreign policy initiatives have had to argue for narrow ex-
ceptions or negligible impact to defend state and local actions. The prevailing view is still that
expressed by Professor Louis Henkin:
By Curtiss- Wright [U.S. v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)] the Federal Gov-
ernment would have all the foreign relations powers, and the states none, even if the Constitu-
tion said nothing. In fact, the Constitution explicitly denies the states the principal foreign
affairs powers, other limitations are clearly implied, and still others have been distilled by the
Courts.
HENKIN, supra note 43, at 228.
60 See McArdle, supra note 54, at 833-44 (suggesting cities and states have a separate First
Amendment right to express their views on foreign policy matters).
61 Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, supra note 4, at 743.
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implemented. 62 Businesses themselves have indicated that their decisions
about business with South Africa have been directly influenced by these
laws.6 3 It is illogical to argue that state or local governments would craft
such precise laws without intending any effects, when enacting simple
resolutions of condemnation would communicate the same messages.
Given the three assumptions set forth above, any deviation by
subordinate jurisdictions from federal foreign trade restrictions will limit
the clarity and force of the federal directives. Because there is no mecha-
nism in the constitutional system to ensure that the state and federal
governments respond uniformly to foreign nations, deviation from the
federal position will almost certainly be the normal outcome of state and
local initiatives. Large or small, the deviations will detract from the im-
pact of U.S. foreign policy. In the worst case, the differences will com-
municate a national foreign policy substantially at odds with the
articulated policy of the federal government.
Nowhere is this more apparent than the history of state and local
sanctions against South Africa. While the Reagan Administration in the
1980's steadfastly resisted imposing sweeping sanctions against the
white-minority government in South Africa, the initiative was taken by
states and cities across the country. By 1986, when Congress passed the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over Reagan's veto,64 over 100 local
jurisdictions had adopted some form of divestment or contract debar-
ment law aimed at companies doing business in South Africa.65 Many of
these laws were aimed at forcing companies to completely disengage
from South Africa, while the federal law sought to use the presence of
U.S. firms as leverage for change.
The federal law did not expressly preempt the state and local meas-
ures, and jurisdictions continued to enact trade restrictions at odds with
the Anti-Apartheid Act.66 In 1991, President Bush exercised his option
under the Act and ended most sanctions.67 Only one state has repealed
its divestment law, however; thus, the situation has returned to one of
minimal federal restrictions on South African trade and extensive state
and local restrictions with significant cumulative effect. What "voice" of
62 See, eg., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-10-12(A) (1987) (defines four progressive phases of divestment
for companies doing business in South Africa, depending on adoption and implementation of the
Sullivan Principles). See generally IRRC SouTH AFRICA, supra note 2. Actions directed toward
Northern Ireland also reflect the goal of reform. See IRRC MACBRIDE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15.
63 See Business Quits South Africa While the Going is Bad, ECONOMIsr, Nov. 29, 1986, at 65-66.
64 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5001-5117 (West Supp. 1991).
65 See IRRC SouTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 99-105.
66 See id
67 Id. at 1.
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U.S. policy toward South Africa does U.S. business or the South African
Government listen to?
The distinctions need not be so extreme to be troubling. U.S. com-
panies have been encouraged to invest in Northern Ireland as a matter of
federal policy. 68 The United States position on the issue of religious dis-
crimination in Ulster has not been sharply defined, however, out of defer-
ence to our relationship with the government of the United Kingdom.69
Due to influence from local Irish groups, 14 states and 34 cities or coun-
ties have adopted laws directed towards forcing U.S. companies active in
Northern Ireland to adopt employment practices purportedly designed to
end discrimination against Catholics.7" The British Government has
identified some of these practices as illegal under British law.71 Under
these circumstances, to which voice does a U.S. firm considering invest-
ment in Northern Ireland listen: to the encouragement of the federal
government or the threats of divestment by the states for failure to con-
duct their activities in a certain way? To which voice does the British
Government pay heed? These questions demonstrate why the courts
consistently focus on the need for the United States to speak with only
one voice in matters of foreign affairs.
As this discussion illustrates, the state and local trade restrictions
are more than narrowly tailored laws designed to achieve purely local
purposes. They are aimed at altering the international conduct of U.S.
target companies as well as the behavior of the particular foreign govern-
ments. They may communicate messages inconsistent with federal poli-
cies or laws. Following these two conclusions, the analysis below of the
validity of these laws under the preemption test, or the foreign commerce
or supremacy clause review, is much simpler. The laws cannot be
sustained.
IV. STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL TRADE
CONTROLS
If an international issue is volatile enough to generate state or local
68 Northern Ireland Statement on U.S. Policy, PUB. PAPERS, Aug. 30, 1977, at 1524.
69 Id. ("However, we have no intention of telling the parties how it might be achieved"). See
generally JOSEPH E. THOMPSON, UNITED STATES - NORTHERN IRELAND RELATIONS, 146 WORLD
AFF. 318 (1984).
70 See IRRC MAcBRIDE PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at 1.
71 See Fair Employment Agency for Northern Ireland, Religious Equality of Opportunity in Em-
ployment: Guide to Effective Practice 3.14 (1987). But see New York City Employees' Retirement
System v. American Brands, Inc. 634 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), where the federal district court
found a likelihood that the affirmative action requirements of the MacBride Principles would be
upheld under British law.
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intervention through trade restrictions, there is almost certain to be some
corresponding federal policy or action directed towards that same issue.
This raises the question of whether the federal action preempts these
state efforts, which has traditionally depended upon Congressional in-
tent.72 In ordinary circumstances, federal preemption of state action re-
lating to foreign relations is simple to find because the states have no
inherent or residual powers in the area that create any presumptions in
favor of state actions.73 The Supreme Court has even suggested that
state action dealing with foreign affairs requires specific Congressional
affirmation to survive preemption scrutiny.74 The following discussion
examines an instance of express preemption by the Congress, the general
test for implied preemption in the foreign affairs context, and the some-
what heated debate over the preemptive effect of the federal Comprehen-
sive Anti-Apartheid Act on the state trade restrictions.
A. Express Preemption - Antiboycott Provisions of the Export
Administration Act
When states adopt trade restrictions that threaten significant disrup-
tion of international commerce, Congress can avoid the delay of judicial
review and piecemeal disapproval by expressly preempting such state ac-
tions. The most striking contemporary example is the preemption provi-
sion of the 1977 antiboycott amendments to the Export Administration
Act:
The provisions of this section and the regulations issued pursuant thereto
shall preempt any law, rule, or regulation of any of the several States or the
District of Columbia, or any of the territories or possessions of the United
States, or of any governmental subdivision thereof, which law, rule, or regu-
lation pertains to participation in, compliance with, implementation of, or
the furnishing of information regarding restrictive trade practices or boy-
cotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries.75
The 13 states that had adopted direct restrictions on their residents'
compliance with the Arab boycott were viewed as a substantial burden to
foreign commerce by the Congress.76 Thus, from the outset of considera-
tion of a federal response, preemption of the state actions was almost a
given. The language ultimately adopted was broad and categorical, leav-
ing little room to argue that states had room to legislate in this area.77
72 Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
73 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941); see also HENKIN, supra note 43, at 236, 244.
74 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91-92 n.7 (1984).
75 50 U.S.C. § 2407(c) (1987).
76 See Arab Boycott: Hearings on S.69 and S.92 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance
of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 421-24 (1977).
77 But see notes 9-11 supra.
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Two significant factors facilitated the adoption of the express pre-
emption of state antiboycott laws. First, the federal law was written in
large part under the immediate influence of two powerful and well-organ-
ized interest groups: the major U.S. Jewish organizations and the Busi-
ness Roundtable.7" Because these groups agreed that the federal law
should preempt the state laws, there was no significant opposition to pre-
emption. Second, the federal statute the two groups helped to develop
was stronger and broader than the cumulative effect of all of the state
statutes. Thus, not only did the business community achieve a uniform
set of rules, but the Jewish groups also obtained a stronger law than the
states had been able to adopt. The lack of a similar consensus and coop-
erative relationship was a significant reason for the failure of Congress to
expressly preempt state and local anti-apartheid laws when it adopted
federal legislation in 1986.
B. Implied Preemption: The General Standard
In Hines v. Davidowitz, Justice Hugo Black wrote:
Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties
and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imper-
atively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be
left entirely free from local interference.79
This decision overturned a Pennsylvania alien registration statute
based on preemption by the federal Alien Registration Act. It stands as
one of the most significant cases in the general preemption area, and as
the single most important decision on the issue of federal preemption of
state laws in the area of foreign affairs.8 0
While the federal system plainly presumes national, state and local
governments exercising authority over the same constituents, the Consti-
tution and the federal courts have provided operating guidelines to delin-
eate respective spheres of power. Controversies arise when different
levels of government seek to exercise power concurrently in matters over
which they possess recognized authority. State exercise of police power,
for example, is a well-recognized legitimate action. Federal preemption
in such areas will not be lightly implied."1 The inquiry in such cases
78 See generally KENNAN L. TESLIK, CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND SPECIAL IN-
TEREST: THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE ARAE BOYCOTr OF ISRAEL (1982).
79 Hines v. Davidowitz, supra note 73, at 63.
80 States have not been completely precluded from legislating on the subject of aliens. See De
Caras v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 361 (1976) (upholding California law limiting employment of illegal
aliens against pre-emption and supremacy clause challenges, in part because of finding of Congres-
sional authorization).
81 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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focuses on Congressional intent to preempt state action 82 and whether
the state action "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 83 Because states
enjoy paramount control of their investment and contracting policies, lo-
cal jurisdictions have sought to benefit from this higher shield against
federal preemption. This approach, of course, ignores the obvious over-
riding international purpose of such divestment or debarment laws.
Where the state has little or no recognized authority, however, the
standard for finding federal preemption is much lower. Thus, in the area
of foreign relations, traditionally regarded as an almost exclusively fed-
eral domain, "[a]ny concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to
the narrowest of limits; the state's power here is not bottomed on the
same broad base as its power to tax." 4 Or, one might add, on its power
to spend. Thus, when states enact laws designed to influence foreign re-
lations, they are acting only by the grace and approval of the federal
government.85
Where Congress has adopted a comprehensive system of trade con-
trols, there is little room for state actions and it is unlikely that the courts
would sustain such state efforts absent an indication of Congressional
approval. 6 Where Congress has not acted, but the President has articu-
lated a national policy, the courts should similarly bar state actions.
8 7
While this appears evident from the Supreme Court's few decisions in
this area, it was sufficiently unclear when Congress enacted the 1986
anti-apartheid law and a heated exchange of views over Congressional
intent ensued.
C. Preemption Applied: The 1986 South Africa Legislation
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 198688 incorporated a
wide range of measures designed to apply economic pressure on South
Africa in order to encourage moderation of its racial policies. These
measures included restrictions on certain exports and imports and on
new investments and deposits, as well as a code of conduct for U.S. firms
doing business within South Africa.89 The law incorporated specific pro-
visions for moderating or tightening the sanctions based on the response
82 1,
83 Hines v. Davidowitz, supra note 73, at 67.
84 Id. at 68.
85 See HEN TN, supra note 43, at 237, 241.
86 Id. at 237.
87 Id. at 244.
88 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1988).
89 Id § 5035. This code closely resembles the Sullivan Principles.
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of the South African government .9 In 1991, President Bush exercised
this authority to lift the majority of the restrictions.91
At the time the law was adopted, the chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee observed that the act should preempt the state
and local anti-apartheid laws already enacted.92 Several other members
of the Senate strongly disagreed,9" and the House of Representatives
adopted a resolution following passage of the law stating the House view
that the law did not in fact preempt the state and local statutes.94 Con-
gress declined to preempt expressly these laws the way the state an-
tiboycott laws were preempted in 1977 in the Export Administration Act
Amendments. The anti-apartheid law reflected more of a compromise
position, imposing sanctions well short of the total disengagement sought
by some of the state and local laws. Thus, express preemption would
have actually weakened the sum total of U.S. sanctions, an effect the
proponents of tighter South African controls wanted to avoid. On the
other side, there was no group pressing for express preemption as the
Business Roundtable had done during the 1977 negotiations for the an-
tiboycott law. Without express preemption of state anti-apartheid laws,
the matter is left to the courts to decide.9"
A preemption determination appeared inevitable even prior to the
1991 removal of sanctions under the traditional standards of review. The
1986 Act was a very complete treatment of U.S. economic relations with
South Africa, representing the kind of regulatory scheme that tradition-
ally displaces state action.96 Furthermore, the objectives of the federal
plan could have been frustrated by the effect of the state rules that en-
90 Id. § 5061(b).
91 Implementation of Section 311(a) of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Exec. Order
No. 12709, 3 C.F.R. § 342 (1992), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.A. § 5061 (West Supp. 1992).
92 132 CONG. REc. S12533 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1985) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
93 See, eg., 132 CONG. REc. S11817-18 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
94 H.R. Res. 549, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
95 Congressional action dealing with the impact of debarment laws on federally funded local
transportation projects may have some impact on the debate. At the time the Act was passed,
Congress said that after 90 days states could not violate federal competitive bidding requirements
because of their anti-apartheid debarment rule. 22 U.S.C. § 5116 (1988). The Maryland Court of
Appeals used that provision to argue that Congress only preempted state laws to that extent; Le,
where such laws impacted federally financed projects subject to competitive bidding. Board of Trust-
ees v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, supra note 4. In June of 1989, Congress revised its
position and permanently waived the competitive bidding requirement on federally funded transpor-
tation projects when it conflicts with state debarment laws. Dire Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations and Transfers, Urgent Supplementals, and Correcting Enrollment Errors Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-45, Ch. IX, 103 Stat. 97, 109 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5117 (1990)).
96 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)("The scheme of federal regula-
tion may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it.")
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courage total disengagement and deprive the federal plan both of execu-
tive branch flexibility and of the leverage afforded by continued presence
of U.S. business in South Africa. These two factors alone pointed toward
preemption, especially in light of express statements of the Supreme
Court in recent cases involving states' use of economic leverage.
Both cases involved state limits on contracting in an effort to further
other goals. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,
the state of Alaska required that any timber it sold had to be processed
within the state.97 Alaska argued that this restriction was permissible
because it was consistent with federal policy on timber sales. In a plural-
ity opinion, the Court said the state had to show more than consistency
with a federal policy in taking steps so intrusive in the area of foreign
commerce.9" In elaborating on this point, the Court said:
The need for affirmative approval is heightened by the fact that Alaska's
policy has substantial ramifications beyond the Nation's borders. The need
for a consistent and coherent foreign policy, which is the exclusive responsi-
bility of the Federal Government, enhances the necessity that congressional
authorization not be lightly implied.99
It is difficult to see how the ambiguous legislative debate about pre-
emption under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act could provide the
state and local anti-apartheid laws the affirmative Congressional ap-
proval they would need under this standard.
In the second case, Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor, and
Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., the Court expressed another concern
that directly affected the state and local laws at issue: namely, the
proliferation of local sanctions, even where they were perfectly consistent
with the federal rules." In Gould the Court ruled that Wisconsin's law
barring firms that violated the National Labor Relations Act from state
contracts was preempted by the NLRA "and thus further detracts from
the 'integrated scheme of regulation' created by Congress." 10 1 In the in-
stant circumstance, the inconsistency of the state trade controls, coupled
with the vastly greater control problems represented by over 100 local
jurisdictions taking action, pose a far more serious problem for the fed-
eral government in an area (foreign policy) far more sensitive to interfer-
ence than domestic labor law.
The decision of President Bush to lift South African sanctions in
97 See supra note 74.
98 Id. at 90.
99 Id. at 92 n.7.
100 See supra note 42.
101 Id. at 288-89. See also Zschernig v. Miller, supra note 48, at 437 n.8 (1968) (Court expressed
concern over the number of states limiting the succession rights of aliens of communist countries).
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July of 1991 brings into high relief the importance of federal preemption.
Under the terms of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, the presi-
dent is authorized to relax some or all of the sanctions as South Africa
makes progress towards reform.1 "2 While the situation there is extremely
volatile, the law was written in a way to permit the President to respond
to major reforms and retrenchment. Bush made the requisite findings
under the act that permitted him to lift the restrictions. The statute re-
mains in force, however, along with authority to reimpose the sanctions
should that become necessary. Compare this flexible regulatory regime
with the plethora of state and local laws enacted over the last 10 years.
Only Oregon has responded to events in South Africa by lifting its re-
strictions. Its law was directly tied to federal sanctions.1"3 The Congres-
sional goal of a flexible sanctions program that could encourage reform
appears in sharp contrast to what is happening at the state and local
level.
An eventual federal judicial determination that the state and local
South Africa laws have been preempted by the federal government ap-
pear strong, notwithstanding the Maryland court decisions, if other chal-
lenges are brought. While there is no federal legislation comparable to
the comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act affecting Northern Ireland, the
executive branch actions point towards preemption there as well. Given
the general predisposition of the Supreme Court to avoid deciding cases
on constitutional grounds, this approach seems the most likely for invali-
dating the laws. Such a decision would still enable Congress to approve
state actions of this nature if the Congress decided it was appropriate, a
policy option the Court would likely wish to preserve for the federal
government.
V. CONSTrrTUTIONAL INVALIDATION: IMPOSITION ON FOREIGN
COMMERCE
In Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court said
that state actions affecting foreign commerce (in that case, state tax laws)
would be given closer scrntiny than those affecting interstate com-
merce.1 4 The Court further stated that these state actions would be ex-
102 22 U.S.C.A. § 5061(b) (West 1990).
103 OR. REV. CODE § 293.830, § 293.867(2)(1991). See Keeping the Pressure on South Africa,
GOVERNING, Dec. 1991, at 14-15. Localities are not totally unresponsive. Over 30 governments
have eliminated references in their trade restrictions to Namibia since its independence from South
Africa. IRRC SouTH AFRICA, supra note 2, at 107. However, at least 20 governments still had
sanctions in place 2 years after Namibian independence from South Africa, U.S. Businesses Awaiting
Resolution of Issues Before Return to South Africa, WALL ST. J., March 23, 1992, at AS.
104 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
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amined to see if they interfered with the ability of the United States to
"speak with one voice" in matters affecting relations with foreign govern-
ments. 1°5 The Court later said in Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Board that a state law could be sustained only if it
"merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign af-
fairs." '10 6 The Court thus refined the one voice test by stating that a state
law would be invalid "if it either implicates foreign policy issues which
must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal direc-
tive.""1 7 As indicated above, the implications of state and local trade
control laws for U.S. conduct of foreign affairs are substantial. They
plainly fail the "one voice" test.
The laws also fall short under the standard analysis of the impact of
state action on interstate commerce, 10 8 which requires a balancing of the
legitimacy of the local purpose with the minimal impact on commerce.
As the discussion above also indicates, the local purposes of the laws
plainly are overshadowed by their international objectives.
Perhaps the strongest argument in support of the state and local
laws is that they are simply exercises of the states' market or purchasing
powers, and are exempt from commerce clause scrutiny under the "mar-
ket participation" exemption. 1°9 Beginning with Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 10 the Supreme Court has decided in a number of cases that
when states act as buyers or sellers they can impose restrictions that
would be impermissible if they were acting as regulators. If the Court
105 Id. at 449 quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
106 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
107 Id.
108 Pike v. Bruce Church, In, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
109 The market participation exemption has generated some significant scholarship. See, eg., Dan
T. Coenen, Untangling the Market Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88
MICH. L. REv. 395 (1989). There has been little focus on the application of the exemption to foreign
commerce activities however, and that work has been oriented towards state natural resource and
environmental controls. See, eg., Note, The Foreign Commerce Clause and the Market Participant
Exemption, 25 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257 (1992). Several articles have looked at the mar-
ket participation exemption as applied to state and local South African sanctions: Lewis, supra note
53, at 478-87 (arguing that it would not apply); Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an
Intrusion Upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 838-41 (1986) (arguing
that the exemption will probably not be available for activities affecting foreign commerce); Note,
State and Municipal Governments React Against South African Apartheid. An Assessment of the
Constitutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 CINN. L. REv. 543, 549-66 (1985) (extended de-
fense of application of exemption to state and local sanctions); Note, The Constitutionality of State
and Local Governments' Response to Apartheid: Divestment Legislation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
763, 789-92 (1985) (suggesting exemption is unavailable to state actions in foreign commerce). See
also Fenton, supra note 17 at 900-10 (extended argument that state and local restrictions do not
qualify for the exemption).
110 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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determines that the state is acting in the role of market participant, the
Court will not scrutinize the state's actions for the burden they may im-
pose on interstate commerce. 1 The Maryland courts upheld the Balti-
more divestment ordinance in part on this ground.' 12
However, it is unlikely that the foreign trade conditions the states
are imposing with their South African and Northern Ireland laws will be
exempted from Commerce Clause scrutiny under this test. In the first
place, the Supreme Court has never used the test to exempt state action
from scrutiny for impact on foreign commerce, although it has only
faced the question in one case, the South Central Timber case discussed
above.'13 In that decision, the Court indicated that a higher standard of
review would be required for application of the purchase exemption to
legislation affecting foreign commerce, although the Court was not re-
quired to reach that question in that case.' " Given the sensitivity of the
Court to the impact of state actions on foreign commerce, as embodied in
the "one voice" test, it is unlikely that the Court would permit states to
insulate their actions from judicial review by imposing them through the
states' economic leverage rather than through political power.
The second reason that the market participation exemption is un-
available for these statutes is because the trade controls lack the direct,
local, economic advancement objectives that are integral to the activities
previously recognized as permissible under the market participation
test.' 15 In each of the cases that allowed state restrictions to continue
pursuant to the market participation exemption, the states were attempt-
ing to provide economic advantages to local residents through direct ac-
tions, such as limiting sales of state-produced cement to residents 1 6 or
requiring local laborers on city projects." 7 As the discussion of (the ab-
sence of) legitimate local purposes above indicates, the state and local
trade controls have very different aims. If the market participation ex-
emption is not available, these laws will be subjected to the scrutiny of
111 Id. at 809-11. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 469.
112 Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, supra note 4, at 749-51.
113 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
114 Id. at 95-96.
115 The Maryland Court of Appeals found that the exemption applied even where the city was
not seeking a local benefit (beyond moral investing) and argued that courts had not limited the
market participation exemption to state actions aimed at economic benefits to state residents. Board
of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 749-52 (1989). All of the Supreme Court decisions
applying the exemption have involved state actions designed to promote some economic benefit for
state residents. See Fenton, supra note 17, at 908-09. See also Coenen, supra note 109, at 441-46
(outlining his framework for applying the exemption). Curiously, Coenen does not consider the
foreign commerce implications in his thoughtful and detailed discussion of the exemption.
116 Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
117 White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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'the traditional Foreign Commerce Clause review, a scrutiny they cannot
be expected to survive.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDATION: FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS
AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The most apparent constitutional defect of these state and local
trade measures is their interference with the foreign policy making au-
thority of the federal government. The states' accession of authority over
foreign affairs to the central government was one of the foundational ele-
ments of the Constitution. 118 While states inevitably take actions that
have some impact on foreign affairs, attempts to direct or influence the
foreign policy of the nation are not acceptable.
While there are few cases on this point, the leading Supreme Court
decision, Zschernig v. Miller,1 19 leaves little room to argue that the state
and local trade laws are permissible. In that 1968 decision, the Court
struck down an Oregon statute that denied inheritance rights to residents
of nations that the Oregon courts determined would not grant reciprocal
rights. 2 The Court had earlier approved an almost identical California
statute, but reversed the Oregon court and invalidated the statute in the
Zschernig decision. The Court based its decision squarely on the Consti-
tution rather than any preemptive federal position,'21 and focused on the
critical implications of the law towards foreign nations.
122
Under the Oregon law, Oregon courts were forced to determine
whether a foreign government granted residents enforceable property
rights in inherited property or engaged in any form of confiscation.
123
Involved in these decisions were judgments about the veracity of diplo-
matic statements regarding property rights in certain (primarily Commu-
nist) nations and speculation about the political nature of those
governments.124 The Court said about the law that "it seems that foreign
policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the 'cold war', and the like are
the real desiderata. Yet they of course are matters for the Federal Gov-
ernment, not for local probate courts."'12
5
On the premise that the state and local foreign trade control laws
are reactions to the conduct of foreign nations and designed to influence
118 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison); see also HENKN, supra note 43, at 227-249.
119 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
120 Id. at 430-32.
121 Id at 432.
122 Id at 437.
123 Id at 433-34.
124 Id
125 Id at 437-38.
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U.S. policy toward those nations, the invalidating impact of Zschernig
seems clear. However, the two Maryland state courts considering the
Baltimore divestment law distinguished this case in upholding the stat-
ute. The trial court wrote that because the law did not require the gov-
ernment officials to make any potentially critical inquiry into the
activities of the government of South Africa, the type of activity the
Zschernig Court found improper was not present in the Baltimore city
ordinance. That court also said that the action challenged in Zschernig
had a much greater impact on the foreign nation because it dealt with the
rights of citizens of that nation. The court found that the main impact of
the Baltimore divestment law fell on U.S. firms, and affected South Af-
rica only very indirectly because divestment laws played little role in
forcing U.S. firms out of that country. 12
6
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's reason-
ing, emphasizing that, unlike the situation in Zschernig, the Baltimore
law "requires no continuing investigation, assessment, or commentary by
local government officials or employees into the laws or operations of the
South African government." 127 On that basis, the court found the ordi-
nance outside the scope of Zschernig's restrictions.
However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find a neutral
law compelling government officials to make what might be a critical
evaluation of foreign states invalid, as it did in Zschernig, yet approve a
law explicitly critical of a foreign nation that reflects the judgment of the
entire elected government of a jurisdiction. If Zschernig reflects concern
over state actions that are critical of foreign governments, as some com-
mentators believe,121 the Maryland courts' distinction is one without a
difference. 129
Further, the Maryland court's argument that the laws have only a
negligible impact on foreign relations is similar to other efforts to distin-
guish Zschernig.130 The concrete impact of the law struck down in
Zschernig was the loss of inheritance by one citizen of a foreign nation,
hardly a dramatic effect on a geopolitical scale. Instead, it was the com-
munication of criticism to a foreign nation by a subordinate jurisdiction
of the U.S. inherent in that loss that caused the Supreme Court to strike
down the Oregon law. It is unlikely that the Court will adopt a factual
test to measure the precise impact or efficacy of state laws expressly di-
126 See Board of Trustees v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra note 54, at 13-16.
127 See supra note 4, at 746.
128 See HENKiN, supra note 43, at 824-29.
129 But see McArdle, supra note 54, at 824-29.
130 See Lewis, supra note 53, at 514-16.
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rected against foreign nations.1 3 1 Because the reservation of foreign pol-
icy powers to the federal government is absolute under the Constitution,
the Supreme Court is unlikely to review state laws interfering with the
exercise of that power on the basis of how successful the states are in
implementing the foreign policies they have chosen to adopt.
VII. THE NEED FOR A DEFiNrivE JUDIcIAL STATEMENT
Although the legal arguments against state and local political trade
controls appear compelling, these laws have continued to proliferate over
the past five years and escaped serious challenge. The political popular-
ity of the laws probably accounts for both phenomena, and presents the
greatest obstacle to prompt resolution of the conflicts these laws are
creating.
For local political leaders, adoption of a contract debarment or di-
vestment law directed against unpopular activity of a foreign government
is a high-visibility, low-risk venture. Constituent groups advocating the
measures are well-focused and have an issue - racial, ethnic or religious
discrimination - that commands broad sympathy. This issue draws the
attention of the local press, is more substantive than adoption of a preca-
tory resolution of censure or disapproval, and presents little economic
risk to the jurisdiction. Potential costs of divestment include fees or com-
missions for selling securities, and loss of earnings through investment in
lower-yielding stocks. The transaction costs can be minimized through a
gradual program of divestment, while the earnings loss is so speculative
as to be a negligible factor.
Indeed, the potential costs of divestment are so indirect that as a
political matter the action appears to be virtually cost free. Debarment
laws create a measurable detrimental impact only if they prevent the ju-
risdiction from obtaining important goods or services. While this is un-
likely, given the wide range of suppliers available, most laws have
provisions providing exceptions for critical requirements. 132 Thus, from
the local political leader's perspective, passage of divestment or debar-
ment laws is a popular decision with little or no economic risk.
The popularity of the measures makes challenges to the laws corre-
spondingly unpopular. What U.S. company wants to be portrayed as a
131 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. at 441:
[Tihe present Oregon law is not as gross an intrusion in the federal domain as those others
might be. Yet, as we have said, it has a direct impact on foreign relations and may well ad-
versely affect the power of the central government to deal with these problems.
132 See, e.g., MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 14-505 (Supp. 1990) (Waiver of
requirements).
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proponent of the white South Africa government or anti-Catholic dis-
crimination because of a legal challenge to a divestment or debarment
law? Given the political mileage a local jurisdiction can obtain out of
fighting a protracted legal battle over the laws, what U.S. firm has a suffi-
cient economic stake in defeating any single statute to finance the fight?
The most significant challenge to these laws thus far was brought by the
Trustees of the City of Baltimore's pension fund, challenging their in-
structions under city law to divest South African related shares.133 The
trustees had a politically defensible rationale for questioning the legality
of the mandate, and access to fund resources to finance the litigation.
The political and financial obstacles to challenges of these laws also
highlight one of the fundamental weaknesses of permitting local jurisdic-
tions to adopt foreign trade controls. The fragmentation of policy formu-
lation enables local groups with strongly held views to obtain local
legislation unreflective of the national consensus. Broader-based or more
diffuse groups with opposing or more moderate viewpoints cannot inter-
vene at every level. The result is a potential distortion of U.S. foreign
policy views. For while there was a national consensus against South
African apartheid, there is nothing in the premises underlying the state
and local laws that restricts them to such widely held views.134 Concerns
about religious discrimination in Northern Ireland, for example, are
much more localized. The renewal of centuries old ethnic hostilities in
Eastern Europe resonate strongly throughout many older ethnic neigh-
borhoods in U.S. cities. The growing political influence of the newer
Asian and Hispanic speaking populations from other strife-ridden parts
of the world will further expand the sensitivity of local governments to
international conflicts. It takes little imagination to envision a combina-
tion of local religious, ethnic, or nationalistic groups and opportunistic
local politicians leading to a true balkanization of U.S. foreign policy.
The political pressures that result in these local laws will also dis-
courage Congressional action to preempt such laws in the near term.
The constituent groups and popular appeal propelling these laws through
city councils and state legislatures do not go unnoted by representatives
and senators representing those jurisdictions. Moreover, at the national
level, opposition to the measures is likely to be perceived more as a de-
133 See Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, supra note 4.
134 Virtually all of the analysis and commentary about these laws has been in the context of the
struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Denying the right of states and cities to join this struggle
has proven as difficult for legal scholars as it has been for legislators. There has been little or no
discussion of the application of the principles behind these rules to other international conflicts.
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fense of the foreign conduct rather than as a statement about constitu-
tional prerogatives.
Judicial invalidation is the only realistic option for correction of this
problem. There has been only one major challenge mounted to any of
the laws, and, as noted above, the Maryland state court decisions uphold-
ing divestment laws have not been thorough or well-reasoned. With
rapid change underway in South Africa, the prospect for additional chal-
lenges seems unlikely. The issue at stake, however, is the fundamental
authority of the United States government to exercise control over its
foreign policy. The nation has entered an era in which trade controls
have become an integral part of its own foreign policy as well as of the
United Nations. While the appropriateness and effectiveness of trade
control tools can be argued, all such tools must be in the hands of the
federal government if they are to be used at all. It will ultimately be up
to the courts to restore the constitutional balance of the state and federal
powers.
